How the Chinese Perceive the Visegrad Group

                                       Liu Zuokui

     Originally published in the Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, no.2, 2016

      Since its establishment in 1991 the Visegrad Group has become the most influential regional cooperative alliance in Central and Eastern Europe. Within the framework of cooperation between China and the region (16+1 cooperation), the Visegrad countries hold the top four places in terms of bilateral trade, accounting for more than 70% of the entire volume of trade between China and the 16 CEE countries. The amount of investment from China in the Visegrad countries (V4) accounts for about 70% of all of its investment in the 16 CEE countries (to 2014). All in all, V4 is a vital part of 16+1 cooperation in the fields of trade and investment.

      Taking into consideration that trade and investment play continuous and crucial roles as China seeks to advance its international relations, great importance must be attached to the weight of the V4 in CEE. The question is, do the Chinese know the V4 well? What are Chinese perceptions of the V4? This article seeks to address these questions from the perspective of scholars, decision-makers, media and business in China. Based on the answers, the author puts forward some policy suggestions to enhance cooperation between China and the V4.

     I. Chinese Scholars’ Perceptions of the V4

    1. Basic information on Chinese academic research on the V4:

There are few Chinese scholars conducting research on the V4. They focus mainly on the V4’s current development and prospects. A search of the most authoritative database of academic papers in China (www.cnki.net) reveals fewer  than 10 articles about the Visegrad Group, from the 1990s to the present. There is no monograph on this theme.

There are a few research institutions dealing with Visegrad Group countries. They include the Institute of European Studies and the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Centre for Central and Eastern European Studies of Beijing University, the Centre for Central and Eastern European Studies at Tongji University, and the Centre for Central and Eastern European Studies at Chong Qing Academy of Social Sciences. The educational institutions involved in Visegrad culture and languages mainly include Beijing Foreign Studies University, the Communication University of China, and Shanghai International Studies University. Only Beijing Foreign Studies University offers full time courses for all of the V4 languages, will Polish, Hungarian and Czech available at undergraduate, postgraduate and PhD levels. The other universities mentioned offer only one V4 language.

2. Chinese scholars’ perceptions of the V4

Chinese scholars hold positive views on the V4 in the following regards:

The establishment of the Visegrad Group is a pioneering initiative carried out by these four countries (initially three) to pursue common identity and common interests. Nowadays, these four countries enjoy comprehensive cooperation in politics, economy, culture, education, science and technology, infrastructure, environment protection, counter-terrorism, Schengen cooperation, disaster prevention, military industries, and so on. They endeavour to strengthen the identity of Central Europe and the common interests of Central European countries. For these reasons, the Visegrad Group is a milestone in the sub-regional cooperation of the CEE region, and of great regional influence.

The Visegrad Group, drawing on its influence in Central Europe, continues to extend its leverage in other areas through innovative cooperation and policy instruments. In the EU, the V4 plays an important role and speaks on the promotion of European policies on energy and climate change, the Eastern Partnership, the European Common Agricultural Policy and the Western Balkan countries’ accession to the EU, among other things. Moreover, the Visegrad Group creatively developed a dialogue mode called “V4+” to expand its global impact and demonstrate its European identity and soft power. There are organisations from “V4+” partner countries in Asia and Europe. Prime ministerial level summits and ministerial level conferences are held frequently or regularly. Besides, the Visegrad Fund, set up by the four countries, is an effective tool for promoting research about the Visegrad Group around the world. Thus, through all these measures, partnerships and areas of cooperation are further diversified. The shared interests of the four countries are increasing day by day and their common identity has been greatly strengthened.

On the other hand, not all Chinese scholars view the Visegrad Group so positively:

The quality of Visegrad Group’s cooperation needs to be improved. For instance, politicians from Central Europe always agree on the Visegrad Group’s ability to influence the EU’s decision-making, due to its voting power in the European Parliament and European Council. But, in practice, it is hard to develop a strong united front due to the different standpoints of the four countries. Although they are in the same region, there are many differences between them, such as market size, culture, traditions, language, currency, national interests, and so on. All of these things lead to poor V4 cooperation within the EU. Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister, highlighted these differences in a speech at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 13 February 2014, saying “we [Hungarians] have realised that there is a German ethnic group on our left side, a Slavic ethnic group on our right side, and neither of them are relatives of Hungarians. It is a miracle that the Magyar nation came to Central Europe 1100 years ago, and survives and maintains its own culture and history until now. Hungarians have an independent tradition but feel lonely. Some also say that Hungary is the nearest Asian nation neighbour to the western European nations”.

The operational mechanism of the Visegrad Group is also imperfect. Four countries decided to build a comprehensive meeting mechanism on the basis of equal political consultation, which means the group lacks an efficient decision-making and governance mechanism. Because of the divergence of interests within the group, many issues can’t be solved by consultation. For example, during the Ukrainian crisis, Poland and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic, insisted on the severe sanctions against Russia, while Hungary opposed this and developed its the relationship with Moscow more positively. Slovakia took a relatively neutral stance.

Because of historical problems and different economic interests, the Visegrad countries lack mutual trust. History makes Slovakia and the Czech Republic sceptical towards Hungary, and Poland’s participation in the repression of the Czech revolution has left a scar on Czech memory. In terms of economic interests, these four countries make similar products, which causes fierce competition between them, especially as regards attracting foreign investment. These internal problems generated Czech’s once President Vaclav Klaus’ and Slovak’s once Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar’s negative attitudes towards the Visegrad Group. In addition, Poland’s level of ambition has been rising gradually in recent years, and on some occasions Warsaw may not put the Visegrad Group at top of its agenda regarding the EU, even in the Central and Eastern European region.

Chinese scholars believe that each Visegrad country has a different weight in Europe, and plays a different role. Poland in particular is a success story from the Chinese perspective. It has undergone successful transformation and gradually increased its influence in the European Union. By virtue of the V4 platform, the Weimar triangle (cooperation between Germany, France and Poland) and the successful launch, together with other European countries, of the Eastern Partnership Plan, Poland is showing its potential and power even more, and its former prime minister Donald Tusk (“Mr EU”) is President of the European Council. Undoubtedly, Poland is top dog among Central European countries, despite the strong influence of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Chinese scholars also attached high importance to the trade and investment environment of the Visegrad countries. Through academic assessments, they came to the conclusion that Poland is the most favourable investment country (with a score of 88 and the full score is 100) among 16 Central and Eastern European countries, followed by Hungary (79), the Czech Republic (78) Slovakia (77), Romania (76), Serbia (76), Estonia (70), Latvia (70), Lithuania (70), Croatia (68), Bulgaria (67), Slovenia (66), Montenegro (65), Macedonia (65), Albania (64) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (62).       

3. The promotion of Chinese scholars’ research on the Visegrad Group

In recent years, with the promotion of 16+1 cooperation, Chinese scholars have played an active role in the Visegrad Fund, which enhances understanding of the V4. At the same time, the Visegrad Group has also begun to pay more attention to research conducted by Chinese scholars. An international conference entitled “Current Trends and Perspectives in the Development of China-V4 Trade and Investment” was held in Bratislava from 10 to 12 March 2014, hosted by the Slovak University of Economics. This project is financed by the Visegrad Fund, and the Institute of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) is the main partner (the author of this paper is one of the participants). It is said that this is the first programme focused on cooperation between China and V4 to be financed by the Visegrad Fund. On 27 November 2014, an international conference entitled “Chinese Investments and Financial Engagement in Visegrad Countries: Myth or Reality?” was held in Budapest, hosted by the Institute of World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, which is also financed by the Visegrad Fund. In October 2014, the Institute of European Studies of CASS hosted a project called “The Comprehensive Cooperation between China and the Visegrad Group”, funded by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The author of this paper is the coordinator of this project). Chinese scholars deepen their knowledge of the cooperation potential between China and the V4 by participating in a series of academic activities and exchanges with scholars from the Visegrad countries. All of these things help to lay a solid foundation for further cooperation between China and the V4.

    II. Chinese Decision-makers’ Perception of the V4

      Chinese decision-makers have good knowledge about the V4 in some respects. This is partly because the findings of Chinese scholars can be delivered to them accurately and in a timely manner, but also due to the rich first-hand information that decision-makers gain from their direct contacts with V4 elites.

Chinese decision-makers have a flexible and pragmatic policy towards the Visegrad Group. They wish to see not only the rapid development of the V4, but also a stronger voice for the group in the Central and Eastern European region and the European Union as a whole. At the same time, they are willing to participate in some activities organised by the Visegrad Group. For example, Chinese officials always attend V4 cultural activities held in V4 countries’ embassies in China. On 19 May 2015, China and the V4 held the first governmental department level consultations. There, the Chinese delegation led by Liu Haixing, director general of the Department of European Affairs at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, engaged in a deep and frank exchange of views with officials from V4 countries, on the topics of China’s relationship with the EU, cooperation between Beijing and the CEE area, and other international and regional issues of shared concern. Although an improvement in such government to government exchanges would be desirable, it does not follow that China is willing to establish institutional dialogues with the V4 in all areas.

       Overall, the Chinese government values highly the Visegrad Group’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe in the following three areas:The Visegrad Group has great value in terms of promoting 16+1 cooperation. Generally speaking, the V4 holds an important position in Central and Eastern Europe, in terms of both economy and politics. As former communist countries, the V4 members have undergone relatively successful economic and social transformation, along with accession to the EU, as the result of a 20-year effort. This has made the Visegrad Group the most representative and influential bloc in Central and Eastern Europe, and in many respects it has played a guiding role in the region. If China handles its relationship with these four countries well, it will improve the quality of 16+1 cooperation.

The V4’s location, and Chinese perceptions of the group as a “gateway” to the European Single Market, also make it important. These four countries’ markets are relatively easy for China to access compared with Western Europe, and Chinese investors can learn valuable lessons from this region before accessing the Western market. 

In terms of the “The Belt and Road” initiative, China and the Visegrad Group have plenty of room for cooperation. Since Xi Jinping’s proposals in 2013 and 2014 for the construction of the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (shorted to “The Belt and Road”), new motivations for 16+1 cooperation have emerged. All 16 CEE countries are included in the “The Belt and Road” initiative, but the Visegrad Group will play a crucial role in this process. Poland is the only founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in this region. Moreover, direct flights between Beijing and Warsaw, the Yu-Xin-Ou railway passing through Poland, the Rong Ou Railway and the Ningbo to Gdańsk maritime line all provide a solid basis for Poland to participate in the initiative. Hungary is the first European country to have signed the memorandum of understanding with China on “The belt and Road” project. The Czech Republic has in recent years been following the process actively, by holding the provincial governors’ forum in order to promote 16+1 cooperation. Slovak officials also expressed similar willingness, and received positive feedback from China.

       On the other hand, there are certain difficulties in establishing a mechanism for higher level dialogue between China and the V4.

       Because of the structure of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, different offices in the Department of European Affairs are in charge of each V4 country. This means that China has more inclination to develop bilateral relationships with individual Visegrad states. There is also a secretariat for 16+1 cooperation in the MFA, to establish a channel for coordinating cooperation between China and all 16 CEE countries as a group, which leads the MFA to the opinion that there is no need to create another sub-regional cooperation framework, since doing so may affect 16+1 cooperation. China hopes Visegrad Group countries will promote multi-dimensional 16+1 cooperation, and offers them the opportunities to do that. Examples are the China-CEE Business Council and Secretariat of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism in Poland, the Promotion Agency of China-CEE Tourism and the Coordination Centre for the Tourism Enterprise Council in Hungary, and the China-CEE Provincial Governors’ Council in the Czech Republic. All of these represent important coordination mechanisms for enhancing mutual 16+1 cooperation.

      It is worth mentioning a speech by Slovak deputy prime minister Miroslav Lajčák at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 3 February 2015, in which he publically called for a four-dimensional model of bilateral ties between Slovakia and China. These dimensions are the relationships between China and the EU, the CEE region, the Visegrad Group, and Slovakia individually, in the combined framework of which Slovakia and China can develop a comprehensive cooperation network. Lajčák also suggested that China could promote its relationship with the other three V4 countries by virtue of the same model. This proposal is very constructive, but due to limited diplomatic resources and the already mature bilateral cooperation with each individual V4 country, it would be difficult to get it onto the Chinese decision-makers’ agenda.

China lacks the essential motivation to develop this mechanism (V4+ China), because the Visegrad Group’s representation is weak in several EU areas to which Beijing attaches high importance. For instance, China wants to advance cooperation with the V4 on trade and investment rules and regulations that could offer more opportunities to Chinese entrepreneurs and easier means of introducing products to the EU market. The Visegrad Group, however, is deeply integrated the EU and the V4’s voice on such matters is subjugated to EU regulations and capabilities. What’s more, the Visegrad Group has no consistent and unique strategic economic policy to attract investment from China and enhance the economic relationship between the two sides. In fact, V4 members are in constant conflict over access to foreign investment.

It is general practice in Chinese diplomacy to treat all countries equally, irrespective of size. But, judging by the diplomatic activities conducted by the Chinese government in the CEE region, it seems that different V4 countries have played different roles, leading to Chinese decision-makers having different expectations of each country. Hungary is China’s traditional friendly cooperative partner in this region, especially since the Orbán government’s “Eastern Dimension Policy”, and bilateral relations have developed very smoothly. But, in the past few years, Poland has attached more and more importance to China’s market and development potential, and has benefited from a series of policies. For example, the first summit of Chinese and CEEC’s prime ministers was held in Warsaw in 2012, and Poland is the only V4 country to be China’s strategic partner. Both facts illustrate Poland’s distinguished position in this region for China. However, in the past couple of years the Czech Republic has demonstrated its willingness to keep up. In 2014 the country hosted the Local Leaders Meeting between China and CEECs, which showed its strong interest in developing relations with China within the 16+1 framework. Recently, ignoring the objections of Czech parliamentarians and citizens, and the actions of other EU countries, the Czech Republic’s President Miloš Zeman attended the grand military parade held in Beijing to celebrate the 70^th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in the Second World War. This important step will surely do much to promote bilateral cooperation.  

    III. The Chinese Media’s Perception of the Visegrad Group

In China, the most popular media includes TV, newspapers and the internet, and they have a deep influence on the Chinese public’s views. The content of CCTV (Chinese Central Television), the People's Daily (the best-known newspaper) and Xinhua Net (the best-known news portal) was assessed for information relating to the Visegrad Group from 1991 to the present. 

CCTV had hardly any news about the V4. From 1991 to 2015, there was one article (dated January 2011), which reported that Visegrad Group Presidents’ Summit was held in Karlovy Vary, and that the V4 stressed enhanced cooperation on energy security, especially on the integration of energy transportation and energy diversification.

 The result is similar for the People's Daily, one of the most influential newspapers in China. There was only one news article (April 2011), reporting that Major Generals of V4 countries had made a joint statement on a combined military unit based in Liptovsky.

  In contrast, Xinhua Net has more than 60 news reports about the V4. The news focused on the Visegrad Summit, the V4’s attitude to important issues in the EU (for example, the Ukrainian crisis, the Eurozone crisis, EU enlargement, the budget, immigration, Visegrad military cooperation, the Visegrad Group’s nuclear energy policy, and other matters.  

It is clear that news reports about the V4 are very scarce, and the themes of articles are diverse. There are no comprehensive or systematic reports on the V4 in Chinese media. The quality of the articles that are published is low, failing to reach the level of knowledge of scholars or decision-makers, and such reports can’t attract people who are interested in the V4.

    IV. Chinese Business Perceptions of V4

    Business is an important force in influencing decision-makers and China’s foreign trade policies. For example, there have long been more entrepreneurs (overseas Chinese) in Hungary than in the other three Visegrad countries, so trade and investment between China and Hungary has been facilitated by both sides. Overseas Chinese are always playing an important role in improving and pushing trade cooperation between China and the countries in which the Chinese diaspora live. This group, for example, has a striking and vital impact on trade between South Eastern Asian countries and China. The impact the Chinese diaspora in Hungary on trade between the two countries is similar. So how do Chinese entrepreneurs view the V4?

    It is hard to say that investment opportunities at V4 level play a decisive role for entrepreneurs dealing with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, because Chinese business sees the V4 as only a sub-regional coordinated mechanism which focuses mainly on non-economic affairs. In terms of trade, the EU is the top regulator.

   Chinese state-owned enterprises and big private businesses attach little importance to the V4 because the market there is too small. The Chinese technology company Lenovo, for example, established a technical assistance centre in Slovakia, but its customers span Europe, the Middle East and parts of Africa. Huawei, the most important telecommunications provider in the V4, has established subsidiary organs in each Visegrad country in recent years, at the same time setting up a regional guidance centre in Warsaw, to promote is business in Central and Eastern Europe and the Nordic region. In an interview with one of the managers who worked in Huawei in Warsaw, he insisted that a V4 sub-regional subsidiary is not necessary because the Visegrad markets were too heterogeneous. At the same time, companies based in some V4 countries are surely in a good position to push business to the whole of Europe. The president of Si Chuan Chang Hong, a television manufacturer with a base in the Czech Republic gave a similar response. At the government level, there are no plans for specific China V4 business cooperation. Neither does the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, one of the country’s most influential NGOs, have any special business-related targets in respect of the V4.    

   Small and medium enterprises also think of the V4 in terms of cost. Establishing a business there on a Visegrad Group level would involve unnecessary expense, so dealing with the V4 on a country by country basis when setting up an enterprise is seen as a better option.   

    V. Policy Suggestions

Different people have their own views on the Visegrad Group based on their communications with V4. These views change over time,  and as exchanges increase. The exchanges between China and V4 should be promoted by 16+1 cooperation, to enhance mutual understanding. Specifically, promotion of Confucius Institute should be continued. Government, enterprises and scholars should strengthen cooperation with NGOs in V4 countries. The media on each side should take part in frequent exchanges, including through delegations aimed at increasing knowledge and enriching the media coverage on their respective sides.

Both China and the V4 should also research the feasibility of establishing a proper mechanism for dialogue. Generally speaking, China should play a supporting role for 16+1 cooperation, and then cooperation between China and the Visegrad Group should be carried out on the level of think tanks and people to people exchanges. Practically, the mechanism of cooperation between think tanks can be set up as a scholarly exchange at a high level. Up to now, with the support of the Chinese government, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has established the China-CEECs Think Tanks Exchange and Cooperation Network, and initiated such a scholarly exchange project. CASS also shows an interest in cooperating with the Visegrad Fund in this regard. On 28 August 2015, representatives of the China-CEECs Think Tanks Exchange and Cooperation Network and the International Visegrad Fund met and exchanged views on cooperation between two institutions, which both would like to boost.

China should deal with the trade deficit with V4 countries. Visegrad countries are the main partners of 16+1 cooperation, and important importers of Chinese produce, but the trade deficit that has persisted for years affects the bilateral relationship. In recent years, China has imported many of Volkswagen SUVs from Slovakia, which in fact changed the trade deficit between the two countries. Mechanical and electrical products are the main export products from China to the V4, which indicates that the process of exporting to Visegrad countries is rather simple. The structure of exchanges of goods shows that there is great potential to tap, and both China and the V4 should look for the products they produce that would be competitive on the other’s market. China can promote investment in the V4 under its policies supporting individual Visegrad members. Due to the EU’s sanctions on Russia, China can also import more agricultural products from the V4.

The Chinese diaspora play an important role in pushing trade and investment cooperation between China and the countries in which they live, so Beijing should attach high importance to the role of these people. In fact, China has adopted a lot of measures to persuade the overseas Chinese to play a role in international relations, but in V4 countries there remains untapped potential in this regard.

Last but not the least, the cooperation between provincial governors on both sides should be enhanced by creating enthusiasm within these Chinese authorities, as well as enterprises. For example, local governments could be encouraged to set up an office in V4 to collect business information that can serve Chinese enterprises with the goal of improving the efficiency of 16+1 cooperation. Because China and the V4 are asymmetric in terms of size, cooperation at local level is more acceptable for both sides..

     Liu Zuokui, senior research fellow, director of the Department of Central and Eastern European Studies, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, visiting scholar at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw, Poland.

Thank you very much to Dr. Patryk Kugiel for his instructions, comments and constructive opinions on my article and during my stay in Poland. I am also very grateful to him for letting me take part in his programme “V4 and the New Emerging Powers”. Thank you also to his distinguished colleagues at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Justyna Szczudlik-Tartar, Dr. Dariusz Kalan, Marek Wąsiński, Damian Wnukowski, Anita Sobjak, for their comments which contributed a lot to my research on this topic. Thank you to my friend Artur Gradziuk for his hospitable invitation and for arranging my visit to PISM.