How can China tailor a successful approach to the Western Balkans? A comprehensive analysis on the role, lessons from and the potential interaction with influential stakeholders in the region

Author:  Anastas Vangeli, Polish Academy of Science

Introduction

The Western Balkans (comprised of Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia) is area that in terms of its population equals Beijing, and in terms of its GDP is somewhere between Yunnan and Xinjiang (ranked number 24 and number 25 respectively among Chinese administrative units). The region is obviously miniscule in size and influence, especially examined with regards to its relationship with an actor of the likes of China.

Defined by its relatively little comprehensive power compared to the rest of Europe, it has been historically shaped as a venue of global politics, but countries in the region were rarely seen as independent actors in global politics. The only exception in the recent history of the region has been the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (1944-1991), which managed to counter the historical condition and establish itself as a regional actor with significant role in global politics. Under the leadership of Tito, himself an active and creative diplomatic figure, it has managed to maintain socialism while escaping from the Soviet guardianship and remaining open to the West, and leading the Non-Aligned Movement. However, before and after, SFRY has had no appropriate counterpart. This is one key narrative that shapes the consciousness and the politics in the region, and its relations with the outside world.

Hence, the region of the Western Balkans is in many ways defined by the relationships with the major foreign stakeholders, which Hadfield calls ‘patrons.’ Adopting her terminology and work, this paper proceeds with an analysis of the matter in the following order. First, I critically analyze the construction of the region of the Western Balkans vis-à-vis the foreign stakeholders, putting an emphasis on the issue of ‘actorness’ (or lack there of) of the countries in the region and the legacies and role of the international players. Then I provide an overview of the economic transformation of the Western Balkans, locating them in the global economic system. Then I provide case studies of the foreign stakeholders, their interests and experiences in the region. I first focus on what Hadfield calls ‘the primary patron,’ that is the European Union (EU), while also taking in account the role of individual EU member states, in the first place Germany. Then I discuss what I call the ‘primary secondary patron,’ that being the United States (US), as well as the ‘secondary patrons’ – Russia and Turkey. I conclude with some general assessments and the lessons and suggestions for China’s foreign policy makers.

The Balkans as a ‘playground’ for international players

After the end of the Cold War, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Albanian system, the region has lost any agency left whatsoever in terms of its role in global politics. With the absence of a strong local actor, the (Western) Balkans has (once again) become an intersection of a myriad of influences, interests and global agendas. Thus, foreign stakeholders and their (inter)actions in the region are often seen as key drivers of the regional politics and economy, considered to be at least important (if not more) than local agency.

Analysts ascribe this condition to structural reasons, although for many this is part of the ‘fate’ of the region, and congruent with its particular historical heritage and symbolic capital. Historically, the term Balkans has been associated with wars, instability and bad politics. The term “Balkanization,” used to denote irreparable political fragmentation, has entered international dictionaries and has been widely used in political as well as scholarly discussions beyond the region. A tendency of a particular kind of Orientalism, named “Balkanism” has dominated the Western discourse on the region, but has been also internalized by domestic actors. As a result, not only have foreign stakeholders, sometimes even unintentionally, adopted a condescending position towards the region, but the countries in the region have been caught up in a perpetual cycle of (self)deprecation as well.

Thus, the legacy of imperialism as well as of being imperial periphery, as well as the legacy of dissolution of empires have greatly shaped the region - and perhaps they are still shaping it. In the past, the region has been part of two great empires, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian one, with the question of independent statehood being raised only in the 19^th century and fully coming into being about a century ago. Most of the political borders of the region have been tailored and enacted through Congresses and Treaties in which the European powers had the main say. This, however, also entailed changes of political systems, cultural codes and mechanisms of belonging – with, for example, the Ottoman non-territorial millet system being overnight replaced with the system of nation-states as defined in the West. Hence, at its core, the Balkans is a region defined by its relations with foreign stakeholders (or patrons).

Throughout the 20^th century, the Balkans has remained an area of interest for the great European and global powers, being one of the main battlefields in the two World Wars. It was also an area with particular contention dynamics during the Cold War, with Yugoslavia becoming an exceptional actor in global politics, remaining non-aligned with neither the West nor the East Bloc, and Albania remaining an outlier and an extreme case. While it is wrong to assume a direct causality between the historical processes and today’s strategic relations due to the sheer complexity of the issues, it would be an even graver mistake to write off history as irrelevant. Certain path-dependent relationship of past and present developments, thus, clearly exists, although a thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.

The fall of communism and the dissolution of Yugoslavia have been processes that were overlooked and managed by the major European powers as well as the US, who positioned themselves as the main stakeholders in the region. This has coincided not only with the fall of communism elsewhere, but also with the political shifts in Europe after the reunification of Germany and its re-emergence on the global scene.

The Yugoslav dissolution was seen as a test for the European Union, which at the time was coming of age as a global actor. From the contemporary historical distance, many argue that European diplomats did not live up to the expectations. The subsequent Yugoslav Wars brought about even more intense international involvement and mediation, by international organizations (the UN), but also by individual countries. The wars in the Balkans were crucial for America’s ‘unipolar moment’ in the 1990s. The Kosovo crisis, the crisis in Macedonia in 2001 and the international response have further turned the region in what many pejoratively call a de facto protectorate.

In terms of the strategic landscape of the region, today there is a particular constellation of power in the region in which the stakeholders - the EU and the US - have the upper hand and often act as mentors, whereas the Western Balkans countries assume the role of followers. In the words of Keil and Stahl, way too often the Balkan countries are treated “as passive subjects of the EU’s enlargement process and as ‘playgrounds’ of different international ideas on state-building (Bosnia), self-determination (Kosovo), economic reforms (all seven) and democratization (in particular Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia).”

The contemporary name ‘Western Balkans’ itself is a portmanteau created by EU officials to label the region of former Yugoslavia sans Slovenia, and Albania. Given the recent history and the troubled development of the region, the name Western Balkans has rarely been associated with success or good news in general. The latest dilemma in the definition of the region is whether to include Croatia as a part of it – in the official EU terminology for instance, Croatia is considered to have “graduated” from the region by joining the EU, and is not taken anymore as part of it. This logic adds on to the political rather than the geographic conceptualization of the Western Balkans.

Regardless of the general feeling of stagnation and underperformance, today, all countries are on the way to be integrated in EU (Croatia is already a member), and the European integration process is at least formally listed as their top strategic priority. Except Serbia, all other countries also aspire to join NATO (Croatia and Albania are already members). These strategic choices were mostly decided through an elite consensus. This might not have been a result of an ideological orientation of the elites towards the politics and the models of the West, but simply a strategic decision, or in some cases, either opportunism or lack of choice. In the process they enjoyed a varying support by the respective countries’ populations – so far, there has been only one plebiscite held (in Croatia), and that one showed a relative division of the population on joining the EU.

The processes of reform and intense diplomatic interaction have attempted to restore local agency in the region, albeit not always on the level of the state. One of the major avenues to achieve this has been the strengthening of civil society in which the financial support and guidance provided by Western governments, foundations and NGOs has played a key role. Civil society in the Balkans has received abundant resources – financial, human and technical – and in fact has emerged as a particular actor and shaper of policy processes – and in the most cases, it has strategically and ideologically backed the agenda of the EU and the US.

At the level of the population the pro-Western sentiment is perhaps more dominant than not, but seems to be declining since the emergence of the global financial crisis in 2008, which has weakened the power of the West and had a disillusioning effect on the people of the Balkans. The void left behind by this, however, has not been filled with enthusiasm for alternative paths (i.e. Russian or Turkish led Eurasianism), nor has stimulated sovereign pursuit of independent path. Instead, the most dominant feeling, at least in the former Yugoslav countries has remained to be the nostalgia for the lost shared country (called “Yugonostalgia”), which can be also perhaps defined as a nostalgia for the lost sense of security, belonging to a stable and strong country, and a nostalgia for the political culture in which prominent were narratives of the bright future ahead.

Failed economic transformation: the European super-periphery

In order to understand the relationship between the Western Balkans countries and the stakeholders (or ‘patrons’ in the region), one must also take in account the post-1989 economic history of the region and its economic relations.

The political turmoil and the wars in the region had extremely negative effects on the national economies in the Western Balkans. Not only they severed the regional and international trade relationships (through cutting off routes or provoking sanctions) and contributed to the deep fragmentation of the former common Yugoslav market, they had also had a devastating effect on the physical and labor capacities. Factories were destroyed, and a large number of workers were either killed, injured or displaced, or mobilized in the armies. The subsequent transition years in the Western Balkans have resulted with multi-layered processes of economic loss. Economies shrank constantly, the production capacities declined and skilled labor migrated abroad. Today, as a result, to use the terminology of the global financial establishment - the countries of the Western Balkans are decades behind the advanced European economies, but they also lag significantly behind the countries that joined the EU in 2004 (but they are not that behind Romania and Bulgaria who joined in 2007).

The systemic changes that brought about the economic devastation were inevitably intertwined with the broader global processes, in which different foreign actors and stakeholders had particular role to play. The first and more important change was ideological – in the minds of the people and in the public debate, Western (neo)liberalism defeated socialism. This was greatly driven by the increasing influence of Western ideas and the decline of domestic and international socialism. It is important to mention that the particular economic ideas that became the new mainstream in the region were not those of the European welfare state, but rather the ones of a market fundamentalism, hence the sharp shift in the envisioning of the new societies, and the way they were built.

This process, however, at its inception was framed as part of the road of ‘Westernization’ and was driven by market fundamentalist ideology, as well as a sharp critique of the former socialist models. Key role in the process was played primarily by the EU, European national-level actors, the US and domestic pro-western actors who provided the ideological justification of the process. No reforms could be done without the supervision and guidance of foreign experts, and no important government decision on the economy could be done without approval and/or the assistance of Western governments, transnational and supranational institutions, and the global financial establishment (i.e. the IMF and the World Bank).

Among experts and policy makers now there is a consensus that the reform process in the Balkans was of very questionable success. For several years after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the economic situation of the region was in fact worsening. In the beginning of the 21^st century, for a moment the Western Balkans countries started noticing better economic performance. Nevertheless, the 2008 global financial crisis has again slowed down the economic recovery, and cemented the region as a European “super-periphery.” As the Economist Intelligence Unit noted in 2012, it was precisely the Balkan countries that “suffered the most from the global recession of 2008-09.” At the same time, the Western Balkans remains a region insecure when it comes to energy supply, being dependent on Russian imports.

Trade

Due to the cycles of economic decline and stagnation, and the misbalances that emerged as a result of the dissolution of the Yugoslav common market, the countries in the region became import-dependent when it comes to the trade of goods – even in sectors where they have been previously net exporters. Today, all countries in the region have significant trade deficit. The trade deficit due to lack of competitiveness is perceived as a key structural problem and impediment to growth, which also contributes to rising current account deficits and causes a negative spiral effect.

Most of the trade of the Western Balkans, including most of their imports come from the EU countries.  On average, the EU in total accounts for 2/3 of the trade of the Balkans countries.  Detailed data on trading partners can be found in the Appendix of this paper.

An important share in the economic exchange with the EU plays ‘nearshoring.’ During the last two decades, practices such as outward processing trade made the Western Balkans region become part of the cross-border value chains, such as in the textile industry (the so called ‘lohn system’ of wholesale clothing production). Due to the cheap labor and other costs of production, the relative proximity and the lowering barriers for the flow of goods as the countries in the region develop closer relations with the EU, a number of producers from Western Europe now export pre-made products and raw materials to the Western Balkans countries, and import back the ready-made products – often intended for the Western European markets (i.e. German, Austrian, Dutch, Swiss textile companies). These type of cooperation results in significant economic activities and exchange, in which producers from the Western Balkans do add value in the process and produce local jobs and stimulate the backbone economy. However, the largest gain at the end is still registered on the side of foreign companies, with limited gains for local producers and little to no improvement of the condition of local labor. Similarly, the Balkan countries are also being considered as destinations for outsourcing of business from European companies, in particularly in the services sector (especially in information technologies) – however, they are yet to live up to their potential.

Tourism is a significant sector of the economy, especially in Croatia and Montenegro who lie on the Adriatic coast. Montenegro in particular manages to attract some investment in tourism capacities, which comes predominantly from Russia. Macedonia demonstrates certain ambition too, but is far from catching up. Cooperation in tourism is certainly an important segment of the economic cooperation of the Western Balkans countries and foreign stakeholders for the national and local governments.

The biggest traders with the Western Balkans have an important stake in the region, and are closely observing the prospects of the deepening of the China-Balkans relations. In some ways, they see China as a competitor. Historically, the first country to experience this challenge in terms of trade with the Balkans has been Turkey. Turkey is a one of the largest trading partners of the Western Balkans countries, and a large share of its exports to the region have been cheap consumer goods, i.e. cheap textiles, household items and simple technological products. However, as the bilateral trade between China and the Western Balkans has been expanding, Chinese goods overtook the Turkish ones. However this is not always framed as a negative occurrence – as one Turkish expert has put it, now Turkish producers are forced to move up the chain of production and produce higher quality goods (i.e. instead of cheap garment, they now shift towards designer clothes for export).

Investment and finance

The relatively weak economic condition has made the Western Balkans countries chronically thirsty for investments and financial support. Given the neoliberal overtone of economic reforms in the Western Balkans, attracting FDI was framed as the major way to achieve economic growth. This was done on the expense of bolstering domestic (re)investment. However, as both domestic and international observers point out, FDIs never flowed as desired. This was primarily due to the lack of political stability, but also a myriad of other reasons, most of them to be traced to the domestic political conditions and relations, and the inadequacy of the reform process. Hence, the nature of the stakes here is twofold – stakeholders care both about their investments, but also about the process and outcomes of reforms – which extend across both the political and economic realm.

The traditional investors and thus stakeholders in the region are the EU and European countries. The banking sector is dominated by European banks, and to a lesser extent Turkish and Russian banks. Most of the FDIs have gone to the service sector, which has also contributed to the deindustrialization process. As a result, what followed was what some experts call a process of "premature" transformation, the asymmetrical and rather "fast expansion of services at the expense of industry and agriculture." This was again an unintended consequence of the processes of alleged Westernization of the economy.

Moreover, as the formerly integrated Yugoslav market socialism, as well as the Albanian socialist model dissolved, and were followed by a privatization process in which often those who profited from it did not increase the production capacities and laid off a huge number of workers. This process was accompanied by privatization of a number of other state assets as well as commons. Often the investors in the strategic sectors were foreign companies, making international stakeholders in the process have a more tangible role (i.e. Deutsche Telecom has gained a prominent presence in the telecommunications sector directly or through its subsidiaries). Moreover, more competitive products from the EU countries have started dominating the markets in the region, thus providing further disadvantage to the local producers (i.e. in the food sector). In addition, deindustrialization has been an ongoing process, meaning that in most of the countries until very recently, or even today, on average, more industrial capacities are shutting down than there are new capacities opening. One of the results of this is a sub-par output in terms of manufactured tradable goods.

A significant portion of the investments have come in fact in the form of mergers and acquisitions, or privatization of formerly publicly owned companies, often in strategic sectors (such as national telecom operators). This process has been uneven in the region, some countries opened their economies significantly, and very fast (i.e. Croatia, Macedonia), others very late and (i.e. Serbia). By 2015, however, all of the Western Balkans economies are fully open and desiring of foreign capital, and more and more privatizations are being announced. Thus, outside actors remain closely observing of the new developments and opportunities.

When it comes to financial arrangements, most of the Western Balkans countries have been piling up debt and all of them are considered to be part of an unflattering group of countries that might sooner or later get into a debt crisis.  The Jubillee Debt Campaign has explicitly mentioned Macedonia, Croatia and Montenegro among the already burning debt crises in the world that might spiral out of control at any moment, Serbia at risk of government external debt crisis, and Albania and Bosnia being at risk of private-sector debt crisis. The countries of the Western Balkans have received loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

They have received other forms of financial aid from a myriad of other institutions, the most significant being the EU and USAID, as well as European (including non-EU national governments). The loans and other form of financial inflows the Western Balkans countries have received have significant political strings attached, making the nature of the stakes in this sector also focused on reforms and good governance, more reasonable public expenditures, openness and transparency, further liberalization of the economy and advancing democracy and human rights.

Of particular importance here is the role of the EU. Its outpour of financial support is to serve the reform process. In the Enlargement Strategy 2013, it has outlined a comprehensive reform plan to boost “competitiveness, investments, growth and jobs” in the region, and tackling a broad spectrum of other issues. The main source of EU funding for candidate countries is the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II 2014-2020) which is aimed to “to support reforms and their sustained implementation in the rule of law area, to strengthen democratic institutions and good governance as well as socio-economic development.” In terms of development funding in the region, the key institutions are the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Primary regional patron: the European Union

The construction of the region of the Western Balkans, as argued above, has been done in relation with its European prospects (or lack thereof). When talking about the Balkans, it is assumed that we talk about part of Europe, but a part that is in many ways unique and special, and needs further “Europeanization”. Consequently, one of its characteristics is that it remains a region of great importance for the EU, and the Union remains the most significant strategic stakeholder in the region when it comes to all matters, including the regions’ relations with China.

By 2015, all the countries in the Western Balkans have manifested a clear aspiration to join the Union, and are in different stages of accession (see table below). EU and the accession process have become part of everyday political culture, and all domestic policies have a clear European component. The EU reciprocates the European orientations of the countries of the region with an open door to their accession, once they fulfill all the conditions required to join the Union. Historic milestones on the road to EU membership of the Western Balkans were the establishment of the Stabilization and Association Process in the 1990s,  and in particular the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, where the EU under the Greek presidency gave a firm commitment to the Western Balkans countries’ EU accession. An important development has been the visa liberalization for their citizens (except for Kosovo), granted in 2009 for Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and in 2010 for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who can now freely travel into the Schengen area – although migration crises have often prompted discussions on potential abuse and eventual abolishing of the visa free travel.

Often, the EU accession process has been framed as a process congruent or even overlapping with the process of state-building and nation-building, which in turn made the EU positioning itself as a more or less a stakeholder over a broad spectrum of policy areas, varying from core state issues to the management of less important ones. As regards the former, EU police missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia were crucial in establishing security and the basic rule of law. Its training and guidance for the public administration in candidate countries has aimed to refashion all aspects of governance, at various levels.  EU has actively supported and supervised comprehensive reforms related to the liberalization of the economy, building functional parliamentary democracies, decentralization of the political systems, and a virtually endless list of other policy issues. A convenient overview of the scope and the nature of the stakes of the EU in the Western Balkans countries can be gathered by having a glance over the 35 chapters of the acquis that are being negotiated with candidate countries during the process of accession – the countries are expected to commit to reforms in all of them, and once they reach a satisfactory level they are considered ‘closed.’

In the past decade, although at different speeds, all the Western Balkans countries made important steps towards EU accession (see the table above). However, the perception is that after years of efforts, there is an obvious enlargement fatigue when it comes to the rest of the Western Balkans countries. After completing the enlargement rounds in 2004, 2007 and 2013, the unforeseen developments in new member states (i.e. continuous struggle with transitional maladies in Bulgaria and Romania as well as Croatia even after the accession, democratic backsliding in Hungary, and fear of these experiences spreading elsewhere), but also the effects of the global financial crisis and in particular the Greek crisis, Ukraine, and the ongoing migration issues have made the EU more inward-looking and wary of the costs of enlargement. Moreover, there are often signs of stagnation or regression in these countries, and in the case of Macedonia there is the name dispute with Greece, which affect the accession process in a negative way.

Considering the overall developments in the past few years, think tankers and experts claim that there will be no new enlargement of the Union until 2020. That enlargement is being  is being downgraded even in the institutional design of the European Commission - while under Barosso there was a particular DG Enlargement, under Juncker there is a joint DG Neighborhood and Enlargement. Hence, some now use the moniker “Restern Balkans” to denote the pause in terms of EU accession of the countries in the region. As Dejan Jovic argues, from a birds-eye point of view, it now seems as the EU, having encircled the remaining few non-members, is now consolidating its position around them.

This does not mean that the EU is retreating from the Western Balkans. On paper, the EU remains highly involved and concerned about developments in the region. Its outlook and expectations for substantial reforms are based on normative ideals. It interests and stakes in the region are comprehensive. The approach as described in the Enlargement Strategy of 2013 is called “fundamentals first,” which takes rule of law at the heart, followed by strong economic governance that will transform the Western Balkan countries in functional and competitive market economies, development and advancement of democratic institutions and processes (which also entails anti-corruption, freedom of the press, and strengthening civic participation), fostering respect for fundamental rights of individuals and groups (and in particular marginalized groups such as the Roma), and pursuit of good-neighborly relations and regional cooperation, and overcoming bilateral disputes (most serious being the Serbia-Kosovo case, but also Macedonia-Greece and Croatia-Slovenia). EU still remains actively involved in mediating regional issues (such as the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations), but also to mediate in internal political crises (such as in Macedonia in 2015). The EU has also started paying a special attention not only on economic governance but also stimulating economic growth and bolstering the economic integration in the region.

The EU also considers itself a stakeholder in the foreign affairs of the Western Balkans countries. Recently, it has attempted to streamline the foreign policies of the countries towards Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and the sanctions against Moscow. Here, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia proved a particularly challenging case, as they decided not to support the EU-imposed sanctions on Russia. More of this will be discussed in the section on Russia.

The EU is also closely observing the advancement of China-Balkans relations, on bilateral level, but also within the context of CEE16+1. The concern for some Brussels diplomats here is that some of the projects undertaken in cooperation with China that, for example, circumvent public procurement and bidding procedures (i.e. such as the highways construction in Macedonia and Albania).According to them, this is an implementation that challenges European norms and standards, and might also unfairly take away projects from European companies. Another concern is that a stronger involvement of China (or for that matter, any new emerging actor) in the region might end up weakening EU’s leverage secured through the “strings attached” on financial aid and loans, an important instrument of EU conditionality for candidate countries.

However, although initially skeptical and hawkish, EU officials are gradually becoming more comfortable with the idea that China might bring new developmental impetus in the region that will benefit everyone, including the EU as a stakeholder.

Germany

European interests in stakes in the Balkans, however, cannot be analyzed only through the EU lens. As foreign policy is one of the least integrated policy areas in the Union, individual member states have their own interests and relations with the Western Balkans countries, which add more layers to the picture. For the purpose of conciseness, I below outline the positions of Germany – the most active foreign policy actor inside (and outside Europe), and briefly discuss Austria, Italy, and Greece (neighboring countries and part of the EU17) although significant players are other neighboring countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania). Their role becomes increasingly important, not only because of their own bilateral affairs with the countries in the region but also because of the assumed “re-nationalization” of the enlargement and the neighborhood policy of the EU, in which member states have an increasingly important say, often as important as the common voice of Brussels.

Of all European countries, Germany has had most interest in how regional affairs in the Balkans develop. Germany is also the largest investor and the leading trade partner of the Western Balkans countries, and its strategic positioning towards the region has been greatly intertwined with its economic interests in the region as well. German companies – directly or through their subsidiaries – important shares in strategic sectors (i..e telecommunications) and German producers play an important role in the outward processing trade in the Balkans. German investment in the banking sector are also present in the region (i.e. Deutsche Bank).

Germany’s position in the Balkans is congruent with the perception of Germany as the reluctant leader within the EU. As Obradovic-Wochnik pust it, “Germany has been the most active international actor committed to pursuing political solutions for the stabilization of the Western Balkans” since 1990. In this, as the official discourse goes, Germany has used its own experience of rebuilding and reconciliation as lessons to be passed on the Balkan countries. In 2009, Germany officially adopted legislation stipulating that “the Bundestag must be consulted on matters concerning EU enlargement. This makes the chamber unique amongst the EU’s 27 parliaments.” Hence even ordinary German parliamentarians play an outstandingly significant role in Western Balkans affairs. In return, Balkans issues, although not a priority political issue in Germany, can often become a hot topic of discussion and political bargaining within the German Bundestag.

As a stakeholder in the region, Germany is active through its web of diplomatic offices and other state institutions. However, there is also a number of political foundations affiliated with political parties or acting independently who have helped shape German policy towards the region but also have had an impact on domestic developments (most notable are Konrad-Adenauer-Stifting affiliated with the Christian Democratic Union, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung affiliated with the Social Democrats, and the Heinrich Boell Stiftung affiliated with the Greens). They have collaborated with domestic political parties and acted in certain advisory capacity, have helped shape the public debates in the Western Balkans and acted as a bridge between Germany and the regional political elite. They have also played an important role in supporting civil society, NGOs and the academic community in the Balkans, at a level higher than other stakeholder countries, thus developing a sense for the local political context but also the public sentiments.

Germany itself is also a home of a sizeable Western Balkans diaspora, which has served in establishing and maintaining a strong people-to-people contact. In the region, German is among the most common spoken foreign languages, although not as widely spread as English. Many of the regional political elites have been educated in Germany and have been affiliated with the German political foundations and networks. Germany has also enjoyed a favorable perception among the general population in the region despite grievances from the past (i.e. in the popular culture it is associated with efficiency, productivity and high quality products).

Aiming to bring in new energy to the regional development, in 2014, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel convened a high level conference on the Western Balkans, which is now becoming an annual event know as the “Berlin Process.” One notable change in the rhetoric in establishing the Berlin Process compared to other EU and bilateral-level activities, was the emphasis on economic development. Some analysts however, have interpreted this as a German response to the growing interest of emerging actors in the Balkans, in the first place Russia, but also China.

Other European countries

The first session of the Berlin Process was hosted by Germany, and in 2015, the conference is going to take place in Vienna, the capital of Austria, another important national-level stakeholder in the region. Given the geographical proximity and the historical linkages in the region, Austria considers the Western Balkans a top priority in its foreign policy, and has somewhat acted in concert with the Germans (as also the example of the Berlin Process shows). It has been active both in terms of first-track diplomatic relations, but also with notable public diplomacy as well as through civil society, scholarly activities and exchange, and people-to-people contact. The official Austrian policy follows the mainstream narratives of stabilization and democratization being the priority in the Balkans. Austrian companies, in the first place banks (Raiffeisen, Sparkasse, Hipo) as well as those working in strategic sectors such as electric energy production and distribution have notable investment in the region.

Another country that neighbors the Western Balkans, has significant historical and cultural linkages and is an important stakeholder in the region is Italy. Historically, Italy has been greatly involved in all matters regarding the Adriatic area, and has considered in particular Albania as a country of special interest. It has a sizeable economic presence in the region through trade and investment, as now important industrial facilities in the Balkans are owned by Italian food, textile (Bennetton) and automobile companies (FIAT in Kragujevac, Serbia). Italian banks (San Paolo) are also present in the region. However, aside from the high economic presence, the cultural and diaspora links and enjoying certain soft power in the region, Italy has less (recognizable) political clout than Germany and Austria and rarely local leaders turn to Rome for important decisions.

Greece is a neighboring country that unlike Italy or Austria, has no other land neighbors in Europe aside from the Western Balkans and Bulgaria. Culturally and geographically, it is often considered part of the Balkans in the broadest sense. Given its position of being significantly more developed and having a peculiar political capital, Greece had recognized its role  as an important stakeholder and had briefly positioned itself as the region’s leader, role model and the most vocal supporter of the accession of the Western Balkans countries in the EU, playing a pivotal role in adopting the Thessaloniki Agenda in 2003. However, Greece’s enthusiasm and political clout sharply decreased with the emergence and escalation of the still ongoing financial crisis.

Greece has a sizeable economic presence in the region, with Greek banks being branched through different Western Balkans countries and owning significant shares in local ones. The Greek telecommunications company Cosmote at some point had a sizeable presence in the telecommunications market, but it sold out some of its shares after the crisis. Greece however remains a leading economic partners of the countries in the region.

Other neighboring countries also have their own interests in the region – those are Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The latter seems so far most pro-active of all. Hungary is a country that has had a foreign policy with a limited audacity and with primarily positioning itself as a follower. However, under Viktor Orban, Hungary has seen a thorough change of both its domestic and foreign policy. Orban now presents himself as a stakeholder in the development of particular political models that drift away from the liberal democratic blueprint, such as the one in Macedonia under Gruevski (hence the close relations, ceremonial celebrations and effective cooperation). Orban also seeks greater cooperation with Serbia, a neighboring country with its own particular national trajectory and foreign policy orientation. However, the most significant step Orban has taken in the last few years was the initiation of the construction of a wall along the border with Serbia, as a way to control the flow of migrants that have been growingly transiting through the Balkan countries. This last point might also add onto the Western Balkans debates in the future – as once the EU starts rejecting or expelling migrants from its own borders, they might easily end up in the ‘encircled territory’ in the Western Balkans, where governments lack the capacity, the experience and the willingness to make feasible moves.

It is important to note that in the past, for instance, France played one of the leading roles in Europe when it came to the Western Balkans – however, in the past decade, its interest and involvement in the region has steadily rolled back, leaving behind an important void that is being filled in primarily by Germany. The UK and the Netherlands had been also active in the region, but they are increasingly seen as following the German approach. The toning down of the strategic involvement of France, the UK and the Netherlands is mostly owing to the financial crisis and the shift of their foreign policy priorities.

Finally, it is important to mention that some of the non-EU countries of Europe are also very active in the region, and can be considered stakeholders, the best example being Switzerland, and to some extent Norway. Both of them are rich countries that have spend significant resources on public diplomacy, and have been particularly active in terms of financing civil society initiatives, including scholarly exchanges. Switzerland has been particularly active through its Development Council, which has focused on areas of interest of the Swiss government, such as decentralization or migration. It has also backed a key scholarly platform, the Regional Research Promotion Program, which has supported key regional universities and think tanks in building capacities and networking with European institutions and experts.

The ‘primary secondary’ patron of the region: the United States

Compared to its European counterparts, the United States of America has been a late-coming stakeholder in the Balkans, given the physical distance and what American diplomats call ‘the lack of vital interests’ in the region. While closely following the developments in the region throughout the Cold War, it first started being vocal on the Balkans only by the end of the 1980s. Under the administration of George HW Bush, the US claimed the survival of Yugoslavia and keeping it together being its top priority, a policy line that was divergent from the preferences of the European powers who strongly supported the causes of national independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

Once the dissolution of Yugoslavia was under way, however, the US changed course and adjusted to the new political dynamics in the region. It significantly increased its involvement in the region under the administration of Bill Clinton. The US assumed a pivotal role in the later phases of the wars in Bosnia, brokered the Dayton Agreement in 1995, and then remained actively involved in the Kosovo crisis and lead a military intervention against the Slobodan Milosevic regime. As Americans faced the September 11 attacks at home, and then embarked on the so-called War on Terror in the Middle East, the priorities of the American foreign policy shifted, and in the years to come the US significantly rolled back their involvement – while remaining an important stakeholder and powerbroker in the region. The official US position towards the Balkans, thus, with the exception of the decade 1993-2003 has been to act as a complementary actor with the EU when dealing with the Balkans, with clearly leaving the primary role to Europeans.

The American involvement in the Balkans in the 1990s, nevertheless, not only had long-lasting effects in defining the shape and the future of the region (cementing its status as a ‘playground’ for foreign powers), but also reshaped the ways of doing global politics, significantly altered the balance of power and the way the post-Cold War world was being imagined. After the intervention against Milosevic (which was deemed to be opposing international law as it was not approved by the UNSC), the US was increasingly seen as a global hegemon, and the dominant pole in the new firm unipolar world order. The Balkan episode of the US foreign policy has served then as a precedent  for the following actions in the Middle East.

Moreover, the American policy towards the Balkans in the 1990s has also influenced the European approach towards the Balkans. For one, the pro-active and assertive American diplomacy in the Balkans has been often framed as a stepping up in the face of the unfavorable outcomes of the European diplomacy and the lackluster performance of the United Nations peace troops in the region. This is often said to be something that at the time was undesirable, but carried out of necessity and lack of alternatives. In fact, this is often used as an argument when American diplomats argue that Europe still lacks the muscles and the resolve to do ‘the dirty work.’ The examples of Bosnia and Kosovo are often used to portray this. Hence, by the late 1990s the European diplomacy towards the Balkans was reframed to prioritize peace-building, reconciliation and stability.

It is important to mention that unlike as in the case of the EU countries, Russia or Turkey, the Balkans has little to no economic significance for the US. Although the US matters as an economic partner to the countries in the region, they matter much less to the US. However, the US does nominally have a stake in economic reforms and processes and the work of the global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In recent years, it has been also vocal on the issue of energy security, primarily expressing concern for the dependence on Russian gas.

Today, the US, according to Daniel Serwer, is “anxious to avoid further American commitments and want to turn the Western Balkans over to the Europeans. Nevertheless, at least nominally, the US has four key foreign policy priorities regarding the Western Balkans, and all of them are concerned with core security matters, such as “maintaining stability and preventing any return to armed conflict; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; building the Kosovo state and establishing it as sovereign on its entire territory; enabling all Western Balkan countries to qualify for and, if they wish, enter NATO and the EU.” One additional tenet is the growing concern for the potential emergence of Islamic fundamentalism and the growing number of individuals from the Balkans who either driven by religion, ideology or promise of profit have traveled to join jihadist organizations in the Middle East. The Balkan countries have been a significant source for recruitment of fighters for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) although their number is lower than the recruits that come from EU member states.

The US remains closely observing developments in the region through its vast and robust diplomatic and intelligence network.  It is additionally concerned for the potential falling of the Western Balkans states in the Russian sphere of influence, which is perhaps the most important reason for remaining vocal on policy matters, and in particular foreign policy orientations and strategic matters. American embassies in the region are considered important venues where various policy matters are being examined, discussed and sometimes publicly commented. Annual reports, testimonies before the Congress and statements by diplomats are considered important indicators regarding the trajectory of the regional politics. American diplomats are often involved in political dialogue of domestic political actors, and can even assume the role of mediators in times of crisis.

The US enjoys a significant level of soft power in the region, with American pop culture being hegemonic in the public sphere. There are a number of Western Balkan citizens who have been educated in US schools, and there is a significant American-based diaspora that plays an important political, economic and cultural role in the region.

NATO

The (prospective) NATO membership of the Western Balkans countries is one of the key points when discussing the stakes the US have in the region. As seen in the table below, the Balkans is one of the areas of the post Cold War NATO expansion in the post-communist space.  NATO however has had a controversial role in the Balkans, in the first place due to the 1999 operation in FR Yugoslavia.

NATO has exercised its influence through constant high-level cooperation, establishing mechanisms of socialization of top political, security and military officials, and leading pro-active public diplomacy throughout which it has constructed the hegemonic narrative that without NATO membership, the security of the region, as well as the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Western Balkan countries is at risk and impossible to be guaranteed. Often, the pro-NATO orientation is taken as granted and as inherently intrinsic to the integration in the EU, hence political elites and pundits often refer to the process of dual, Euroatlantic integration.

Today, all of the countries in the region except Serbia, have adopted a firm dedication to the North-Atlantic agenda, and have undergone a process of alignment of the security policy as well as a thorough security sector reform. At least on paper, they have been some of the most enthusiastic and dedicated supporters of NATO but also of the American national foreign policy in the cases of the operations in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Croatia and Albania have become member countries of the Treaty Organization in 2008, whereas Macedonia’s membership is on hold due to the name dispute with Greece. Kosovo on the other hand, is an outstanding case, where the role of NATO has been extensive and comprehensive – NATO through its Kosovo Force (KFOR) has de facto fulfilled the role that a national security apparatus is supposed to play, while training Kosovo’s national army and police.

Serbia, given the historical legacy and the fact that it has been a target of a NATO military operation, is the only country in the Western Balkans that does not officially aspire to become a member of the Alliance. However, under the Vucic government it has become ever closer with the NATO, engaging in continuous dialogue and cooperation.

USAID

USAID is the American agency for international development, which administers large amounts of state funding aimed towards development projects around the world. It is a tool of both financial assistance and American soft power. The Balkans has been one of the regions of focus after the end of the Cold War. USAID usually partners with local institutions and organizations in the countries where it operates, thus not only transferring funds, but also working on networking and capacity building.

In Albania, USAID works with the judiciary, the local governments and the business and the financial sector; in Bosnia it works on overall stabilization, democratization and promotion of good governance; in Kosovo it works on economic growth, opportunities as well as overall governance improvement; in Macedonia it works on strengthening democracy through support of institutions, civil society and the media, boosting economic growth and improving education; in Montenegro it works on stimulating the economy, improving transparency of the government and overall support of the EU accession reforms; in Serbia it works on strengthening state institutions and civil society, and is focused on economic growth and good governance.

 ‘Secondary patrons’: Russia and Turkey

While the ‘secondary patrons’ of the region Russia and Turkey do have important stakes in Balkan affairs , are increasingly involved in Balkan affairs, and are increasingly embraced as partners by domestic political elites, it is important to emphasize that they themselves do not offer no alternative to the framework of stabilization, security guarantees, and integration as it is offered by the EU, with the complementary role of the US. On the other hand, both Russia and Turkey, do offer an alternative narrative of the identity and the sense of purpose of the Balkans in global politics, which is interrelated with shared cultural and political traits. At the same time both Russia and Turkey, as emerging economies, have managed to become significant economic partners of the region, with Russia in particular being the main gas supplier.

Russia

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had a turbulent relationship with Yugoslavia and Albania, and after 1989, Kremlin faced a myriad of domestic and neighborhood issues, and lacked the resources to pursue meaningful ties with the Balkans. Moreover, the Balkans, while traditionally considered a region of some interest to Russia, is still a remote one and less of a concern for Moscow compared to its immediate neighborhood (Eastern Europe and Central Asia).

The first notable Russian involvement in Balkan issues happened throughout the Kosovo crisis, when Kremlin stepped up as the most vocal supporter of the Milosevic regime on the international scene and particularly in the UN Security Council. Kosovo was framed as an issue of central importance to Russia, as it was used as an example to portray the lack of fair play in the post Cold War global order. Kosovo has been used as a key narrative when framing the Russian position towards the Ukrainian crisis and in particular the case of Crimea.

As the relations between Russia and the EU and the US in 2015 are at their worst since the end of the Cold War, it is obvious that the contention between them will spill over across different regions. The Balkans is thus one of the proxy regions where the friction between Russia and the West is being manifested. A number of pundits and diplomats (including senior figures such as John Kerry or Sergei Lavrov) have explicitly confirmed this. Given the dominant role of EU and the US in the region, most often the Russian position is framed as the one “subverting” the hegemonic order, and is often a strong pro-Russian sentiment is seen as dangerous. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the weakening position of the West, combined with the disillusionment with the process of “Westernization” of the Balkans, as well as the stagnation of the EU enlargement, the door for increased Russian influence in the region remains open.

In the first decade of the 21^st century, as Russia was bouncing back through consolidation of the Putin regime at home and using its energy supplies to pursue interests abroad, it strengthened its ties with Serbia (and Bulgaria), and developed its relationships with other countries. Aside from the contentious relationship with the West and the proxy conflicts in the region, Russia considers the Balkans “a sphere of particular interest,” which in the first place matters because of the transit of oil and gas (South Stream/ Turkish Stream), but also as an important exports destination. The buzz in Russian media and the overall interest of Russian diplomats in the Balkans has particularly increased in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia’s policy towards the Balkans is underpinned by a constructed narrative of shared history and identity, which – as many other narratives – is based on a particular interpretation of history. Hence, Russia and its supporters in the Balkans emphasize Slavic culture and Orthodox Christianity, and attempt to appeal to those parts in society in politics that are generally disillusioned with the West, but also to incumbent political elites that attempt to depart from the liberal democratic blueprint. In this, Russia acts in a realist and pragmatic manner, often exploiting the patron-client relations and networks that exist in the region. Russia is an important economic partner of the countries in the Western Balkans, but its presence – although on the rise – is still far smaller than the one of the EU companies.

Russian investments in the region, however, come primarily in the energy sector, with Russian giants such as Gazprom and Lukoil being branched in all the Western Balkans countries. Russia is dominant in the energy sector, with all the countries being mostly or fully dependent on Russian gas, which raises concern in the EU and the US. However, even though Russia dominates the energy sector, the Balkans is predominantly seen as a potential transit route, where potential branches of the Turkish Stream pipeline project could be built.

Significant Russian investment can be also found in the banking sector, in real estate and in tourism capacities, with a significant case being Montenegro (in some policy  circles called “Moscow-by-the-sea”). Analysts have claimed that roughly a third of the private enterprises are linked to Russia and up to a half of the coastal properties in the country are owned by Russians. However, the Russian economic influence in Montenegro has seemed to have peaked, as the country has advanced in its pursuit of EU and NATO membership and intensify relations with the West.

The Ukrainian crisis and the worsening of the EU-Russia relations in 2014 provided a litmus test for the success of the Russian initiatives in the Western Balkans. The Serbian, Bosnian and Macedonian governments were particularly unwilling to participate in the sanctions against the Kremlin, an attitude that was nonetheless not only grounded in their desire to maintain good relations with Russia, but also with the divisions within the EU regarding the issue. On the other hand, Albania and Montenegro did take part in the sanctions.

While substantial cooperation between Russia and the EU or the US in the Balkans is not very likely in the near future, Russia remains open to cooperating with other emerging actors in the region, in particular Turkey, an important partner in constructing energy infrastructure.

Turkey

The Turco-Balkan relationship is shaped by the historical relations of the two sides. A significant portion of the Balkans has been part of the Ottoman Empire for a period of six centuries, up until the second decade of the 20^th century. While the primary connection of Ankara with the region is with the ethnic Turkish, the Turkish-speaking and the Muslim population, its contemporary foreign policy towards the region is equally conditioned by strategic as it is by cultural determinants.

To understand the nuances of Turkey’s involvement in the region, one must understand the discourses of the contemporary Turkish foreign policy. As Omer Taspinar argues, in the 21^st century, Turkey’s global and regional orientations are underpinned by three strategic visions – a neo-Ottoman, a Kemalist and a “Turkish Gaulist” one. In all visions the Balkans matters as a region – and often Turkish diplomats would even frame Turkey as a Balkan state (as part of its territory in fact lies in the Balkans).

Neo-Ottomanism as championed by Davutoglu (formerly a foreign policy pundit, Minister of Foreign Affairs and now a Turkish Prime Minister and one of the closest aides of Erdogan) has soft power at its base, and is a post-imperial ideology based on the awareness of Turkish role and purpose in the broader neighborhood, and the sense of multiculturalism within a Muslim hegemonic cultural system. It is characterized with a certain sense of grandeur and self-confidence with an emphasis on the role of Turkey as a bridge of the East and the West. It thus sees the Balkans as an area of strategic interest in which Turkey has a stake also of the comprehensive regional development.

This is however complemented by Kemalist determinants in Turkish foreign policy, shaped by the idea of Turkey as a modern-nation state with its own challenges in global politics. Turkey, in this sense, has to carefully navigate between the different powers and their interests and be a more cautious player. This means that in the Balkans while having significant stakes and interests, it faces constraints – which are determined by the stakes and interests of other stakeholders in the region.

Finally, one tendency in Turkish foreign policy that emerges as a combination of the Neo-Ottoman and the Kemalist legacy is the so-called “Turkish Gaulism” – whose main features are a regional orientation, self-confidence but also a pro-active realist behavior. Combined with its rapid economic growth and economic clout in the region, a Gaulist-type of foreign policy places Turkey in the ranks of actors such as Russia and China. In terms of its Balkans policy, it means that Turkey sees the region both as inherently part of its broader neighborhood and zone of influence, but also as a chessboard and a potential field of competition with other actors.

A G-20 economy, Turkey is one of the main economic partners of the Western Balkan countries. It holds major investments in transport infrastructure (highways and air transport), banking as well as industry capacities. It is estimated that the amount of Turkish investment in the region rose from 2.9 billion USD in 2000, to 17.5 billion USD in 2012. Moreover, in the period after the financial crisis, while the EU countries and the US have reduced their economic activity in the region, Turkey remained pro-active, thus strengthening its position.

Turkey itself is an EU candidate country, officially negotiating its membership since 2004. However, given the skepticism in several of the EU member states towards Ankara, as well as the turn towards a less liberal order in the last years under the leadership of Erdogan, it is likely that Turkey will not join the EU soon. Nevertheless, in the Balkans Turkey positions itself as a complementary actor, meaning that its official policy line is firmly supporting the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU. Turkey is also a member of the NATO, and is likewise a firm supporter of the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the Treaty Organization.

However, on political matters Turkey seems to be crafting a new, authentic approach that may or may not correspond to these strategic objectives. Turkish officials and diplomats have recently expressed attitudes in favor of particular ethnic groups or political causes (i.e. Bosnian Muslims, the independence of Kosovo, or the contested Gruevski regime in Macedonia) that are considered sensitive when it comes to the future of the region.

Turkey closely observes and is a potential partner of initiatives of the emerging actors in the region. While not necessarily having similar agenda with Russia in the region, Turkey and Russia could partner in building the energy infrastructure in the region. For one, Turkey is now a pivotal area for the expansion of the Russian pipeline network towards Europe, including the Balkan branches of the so called Turkish Stream. Turkey also closely observes the Chinese involvement in the region, and in particular the unveiling of the projects within the framework of the One Belt, One Road Strategy, as it is one of the major stakeholders in the development of the transport infrastructure in the region.

Turkey also has had a pro-active public diplomacy in the Balkans, with significant support of cultural cooperation, conservation of cultural heritage (primarily from the Ottoman era), education and religious initiatives. However, there are growing concerns that in the last several years, as the Turkish government under Erdogan started assuming a more conservative positions and emphasizing Islam, so has shifted its soft power in the Balkans. A number of infamous political Islamist movements and groups have been often linked to official Ankara, which has not helped in promoting positive image of Turkish public diplomacy. Turkey however is considered to be a moderate Islamic state and to counter radical Islamism, and is still considered to be a counter-force rather than a supporter to fundamentalist organizations.

Conclusions and recommendations for China

Below, I provide a general overview of the relations of the Western Balkans countries and the foreign stakeholders, based on the analysis above.

When putting the region in context, it should be analyzed primarily as an immediate neighborhood of the EU, and in particular as an EU enlargement area (with Croatia already a member). EU is the most important stakeholder in the region, and the one that is closely observing the development of China-Balkans relations. Europeans have a comprehensive interest in the region – both economic, political and cultural. Aside from the EU as a supranational institution, not all European states are equally interested in the region. As the paper argues, Germany is the single most important state with particular strategic interests in the Balkans, although countries such as Austria, Italy, Greece or Hungary have also particular stakes in the region – although their role varies individually. Other EU member states, but also European non-EU states (Switzerland, Norway) play an important role too. Do the interests of all this actors converge? It is something that this paper partially tackles, although the question ultimately remains an open-ended one. In the Balkans, thus, China faces similar situation as when dealing with Europeans elsewhere: there is the EU as a particular stakeholder, but there are also many national governments whose interests may or may not follow the common European policy line, all of them comprising a multi-level game. It is up to diplomats and scholars navigate the intra-European similarities and differences when it comes to the approach to the Western Balkans, but also China-Balkans relations.

The Western Balkans is also a zone of influence of the US. Given the particular dynamics of US-China relations throughout the past two decades – including their contradicting perceptions in the Balkans during the Kosovo bombing – and particularly, having in mind the process of reformatting the “great-power” relations initiated by the Chinese president Xi Jinping, this may as well resemble a strategic challenge for China. What the US stands for in the Balkans and the way it has carried its foreign policy in the region is in many ways divergent from the principles on which China’s foreign policy is run – that is peaceful coexistence, non-interventionism and utmost respect for national sovereignty. Hence, the involvement of China in the region will have to be cautious and carefully navigate through any potential friction with the US on these issues.

Russia has important stakes in the Balkans as well. An ambitious global actor under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has increasingly demonstrated interest in the region, which may affect the geopolitical balance in the future. Given the importance of Sino-Russian relations, Chinese policymakers will have to also count on the role of Moscow when tailoring its approach to the Balkans. Getting to close to Moscow will perhaps result with a more negative perception of China in the eyes of European and American diplomats; but it cannot afford to get too distant from it either.

Last but not the least, the largest portion of the Balkans having been part of the Ottoman Empire until the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913, there is a strong linkage between the region and Turkey. Today, Turkey is strategically involved in the region as well, in ways that differ from the way the rest of NATO is, looking at it also as an economic area of interest. Ankara represents another important point of reference for China’s foreign policy in the Balkans. Given its interest in developing the region’s infrastructure, it could well prove to be partner for China’s One Belt One Road strategy in the region.

However, aside from interaction with the current stakeholders, China has plenty of maneuvering space to pursue its own independent initiatives that can work for mutual benefit of both Beijing and the countries in the region.

In order to provide grounds for win-win relationship and have strong economic partners in the Balkans, China should learn from the mistake of others from the past, who did not prevent nor worked on mitigating the adverse effects of the processes of fragmentation of the markets and the chains of production and supply in the region. Hence, China should support efforts of economic (re)integration of the region of the Western Balkans. In terms of trade this can be done by for instance establishing multinational trade chambers and coordinating the trade with all Balkan countries, the transport and distribution of goods. China has the capacity, appeal and the interest to do this – it will also make it easier for Chinese companies interested to trade with the Balkans. However, this move must be done in communication with the EU so as the economic reintegration of the region follows EU standards and regulation.

China should maintain and step up its role in transport and energy infrastructure investment in the region. This is an area where there the Balkan countries manifest a very big need, but have very limited supply. However, here China also needs to nurture a regional approach – this fits well within the blueprint of the One Belt One Road and the CEE16+1 initiative. China should in particular pursue projects in the field of clean transport (electric vehicles and railways) and renewable energy and green development, something that it is already perfecting at home. Given the climate conditions, the Balkans could be a region where a solar panel revolution could easily take place.

In the realm of political relations, Chinese policy makers should critically examine the question why after so much effort, the perceptions in the region are divided when it comes to the appeal EU and the US, but also Russia and Turkey? Why people in the region are skeptical towards foreign partners, and the elites seem to be reluctant partners? What China can learn is that the deep strategic involvement has both good and bad sides, not only in terms of the public image and the soft power of the actors, but also in terms of relationships with domestic political actors/elites and inadvertently affecting the course of a nation in one direction or another which then invokes a certain path-dependence. China in this sense, should not become another ‘patron’ but rather an equal partner of the region – which might be rewarding on the long run.

China has a major change to show that a different, fairer diplomacy is possible. This can be done through initiating a China-Balkans Forum, which would also support the process of regional communication and integration, something that is constantly lacking. By stepping back and not being the ‘leader’ China can assume a role of ‘moderator’ while the main goal will be discussion and exchange between the Balkan countries. This would be one opportunity to boost the actorness of Western Balkan states and help them develop much needed capacities.

China also has a chance to innovate in terms of its public diplomacy and pursuit of soft power. Here it is very important to pursue meaningful ties with non-state and independent actors, particularly in the fields of culture, education and civic engagement. Although the model of civil society driven by non-governmental actors is not fully compatible with the Chinese concept of civil society, it offers an already functional mechanism of interaction that helps to both strengthen mutual ties, help the two sides learn a lot, and advance their mutual interests – and moreover actors in the Western Balkans are used to it. Moreover, it so happens that in the Balkans the biggest capacities for such interaction are to be found outside the governments (i.e. for instance, the best think tanks and research organizations are non-governmental ones; the best experts happen to be working independently).

China could be pro-active and creative in the pursuit of cooperation with Western Balkans non-governmental subjects. Here in the first place I mean universities, think tanks, civil society organizations that work in research and advocacy, and media. There is a burgeoning field, a number of people who work in it, and a window of opportunity for advancing China-Balkans relations and people-to-people relations.

Finally, China needs to reach out and attempt to build a community of the few in number, but very enthusiastic alumni of Chinese universities and people who have been acquainted with China before, and with Chinese expats in the region. So far, there is no platform or institution that offers an opportunity for building a community that would bring these individuals together. However, should such synergy be created, it offers a great potential of further advancing Sino-Balkan relations.

From Huang Ping, Liu Zuokui edited, Stakeholders in China-CEEC Cooperation, China Social Science Press, 2016.